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PREFACE 
This paper presents a discussion of methodological issues 
in multiobjective analysis, encompassing various approaches to 
multiobjective optimization and decision making. The main thesis 
is that while there are already many methods for multiobjective 
analysis, this field would gain from further methodological 
reflection. 
CRITICAL ESSAY Oij THE METHODOLOGY 
OF PIULTIOBJECTIVE ANALYSIS 
Andrze j P. W i e r z b i c k i  
1. INTRODUCTION: WHAT I S  MULTIOBJECTIVE ANALYSIS? 
The v a r i o u s  methods  f o r  m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  o p t i m i z a t i o n  and  
d e c i s i o n  making t h a t  have  been deve loped  s i n c e  t h e  work o f  
P a r e t o  (1896) h a v e  r e c e n t l y  been summarized i n  s e v e r a l  books 
[Keeney and R a i f f a  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ,  Spronk ( 1 9 8 1 ) ,  Cohon ( 1 9 7 8 ) l ;  o n e  o f  
t h e  m o s t  i n c i s i v e  summaries  [ R i e t v e l d  ( 1 9 8 0 ) l  relates t o  r e g i o n a l  
p l a n n i n g .  I n  g e n e r a l  terms, t h e s e  methods d e a l  w i t h  t h e  s i t u a -  
t i o n  where o n e  or  m o r e  p e r s o n s  must g e n e r a t e  a n d  c h o o s e  be tween 
v a r i o u s  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t h a t  c a n n o t  b e  e v a l u a t e d  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  a 
s c a l a r  p e r f o r m a n c e  measure  ( a  ' s i n g l e - o b j e c t i v e ' )  a l o n e .  I n s t e a d ,  
t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  mus t  i n v o l v e  a  number 0.f p e r f o r m a n c e  c h a r a c t e r i s -  
t i c s  ( ' m u l t i p l e  o b j e c t i v e s ' )  which are o f t e n  n o t  commensurable.  
Such s i t u a t i o n s  o f t e n  ar ise  when t e c h n o l o g i c a l ,  economic,  
social  or  p o l i t i c a l  d e c i s i o n s  are made, a n d  a r e  u s u a l l y  r e s o l v e d  
either by intuition, or by the collective processes of choice 
that have grown up throughout human history. Thus, there is 
nothing new in multiobjective decision making--people have been 
doing it for thousands of years. However, this term has recently 
taken on a new and much more specific meaning with the applica- 
tion of mathematical methods to the problem. These methods are 
generally designed to clarify the decision making situation and 
to generate useful alternatives; sometimes they involve consider- 
able use of computers and computerized models. However, in none 
of these methods can a single practical decision be made without 
the involvement and approval of people--and the author hopes that 
this will never happen, except in the most routine of situations. 
To call this group of methods 'multiobjective decision making' 
without further qualification is therefore seman~ically mislead- 
ing; we should perhaps rather refer to it as muZtiobjcctCve 
analysis. 
Some researchers concentrating on the mathematical part of 
the multiobjective analysis prefer to speak of multiobjective 
optimization. However, this would limit the field of study to 
a particular area of mathematics, while the motivation and 
importance of multiobjective analysis come not from mathematics 
but rather from applied problems. Thus, for methodological 
clarity, we should consider multiobjective analysis as a part of 
the multidisciplinary applied science called applied systems 
analysis. 
Some readers might object to the definition of 'applied 
systems analysis' as a 'multidisciplinary applied science'. For 
example, Rietveld (1 980) defines sy s tems theory more traditional- 
ly as a new science concerned with the functioning of systems in 
general, and the word system itself has a very old meaning as a 
description of a set of elements and the relationships between 
them. However, this definition is too broad: on this basis 
Ptolemy, Copernicus and Bohr were systems analysts, since the 
first two investigated the solar system, while the third studied 
the atomic system. The new factor in contemporary systems 
analysis is the realization that certain methodological principles 
and mathematical tools can be applied to systems in a multi- 
disciplinary fashion. 
Contemporary systems analysis also lays great importance on 
the applied or empirical aspects of research. Mathematical 
systems theory is a new and still developing branch of applied 
mathematics.which includes the theory of dynamical systems, 
optimization theory, some aspects of economic equilibrium theory, 
game theory and multiobjective decision theory. Though the 
initial practical motivation (for example, mechanics, electronics, 
economics) underlying any part of mathematical systems theory is 
responsible for the basic concepts, the theory still remains a 
branch of applied mathematics, where the fundamental questions 
are those of syntactical correctness and completeness o f  mathe- 
matical language; questions of semantic importance are considered 
valid only in the sense of motivation. This interpretation of 
mathematics as a language in which empirical statements can be 
formulated and transformed, but never validated (in the empirical 
sense) is quite clear in the modern philosophy of science, from 
the work of Russell (1927) on mathematical logic, through the 
development of logical empiricism, to the work of Popper (1959). 
Thus, it is the applied nature of systems analysis that holds 
the real meaning, for all the beauty of the mathematical language 
that we can use to describe it. 
An empirical scientific statement is one that purports to 
explain some observations made in the real world and admits an 
empirical falsification test [see Popper (1 959) 1 . Such state- 
ments may not have any immediate uses, at least none that can be 
easily perceived. By contrast, the applied sciences concentrate 
on producing empirical statements of perceived direct usefulness, 
though these might-be limited in their precision and validity. 
Some researchers distinguish between science and technology 
on the understanding that science is interested in the universal 
questions of general validity, while technology considers ques- 
tions of an approximate, 'good enough', .'mostlyf, 'can do' 
character [Rose (1982)J. On this basis, systems analysis is a 
multidisciplinary methodology for technological thought. However, 
this understanding of technology is peculiar to the English 
language; more-modern usage and most other languages prefer the 
broader term of applied sciences. 
When using this phrase, however, we must avoid narrow inter- 
pretations in-terms of utilitarian science. This can be illus- 
trated by the following anecdote about three people who, not 
knowing anything about electricity, observed that amber some- 
times attracts pieces of paper. One of them, a utilitarian 
scientist, concluded that this amusing fact could have no possible 
uses. Another one, a technologist, started to produce toys 
based on this observation. Finally, the third individual, a 
good scientist, decided to study the phenomenon, with the result 
that he discovered electricity and all its potential applications. 
To summarize these initial remarks, we can state that multi- 
objective analysis is part of a multidisciplinary applied science 
called systems analysis, and is concerned with situations in 
which complex decisions involving many objectives must be made. 
Its purpose is to clarify the problem by constructing prototypes 
of decision situations, using certain fundamental concepts based 
on empirical observations. After the prototype situations and 
related concepts have been chosen, they are described in mathe- 
matical language, and mathematical tools can then be used to 
suggest how these situations should be handled. While the 
development of mathematical methods for multiobjective analysis 
is an important element of this scientific discipline, it is 
even more important that any statement in the multiobjective 
analysis should be validated by repeated empirical falsification 
tests. The generally accepted methodological principle behind 
the semantic validity of scientific hypotheses is that an 
empirical scientific hypothesis cannot ever be proven, but may 
be accepted if it passes various falsification tests. This 
distinguishes an empirical- statement from a mathematical- one 
whose syntactic correctness is subject to rigorous proofs. Since 
we consider multiobjective analysis to be an empirical scientific 
discipline, we must chqose mathematical tools and language that, 
while syntactically correct, yield statements that are both 
empirically testable and-semantically'valid. 
The critical analysis put forward in this paper attempts to 
show that the above principles, while generally accepted in the 
methodology of sciences, have been observed only to a limited 
extent in the development of multiobjective analysis. Further 
development of this relatively young discipline will require 
much stronger adherence to these methodological principles. 
2. PROTOTYPES OF DECISION SITUATIONS 
2.1 Basic Prototype: Centralized Decisions 
Most of the work in multiobjective analysis is based on the 
prototype decision situation illustrated in Figure l(a). This 
involves a 'decision maker' (a single person who has the author- 
ity and experience to take the actual decision); an 'analyst' or 
team of analysts responsible for the analysis of the decision 
situation; and a 'substantive model of the problem' that is 
supposed to represent all the pertinent knowledge that the 
analyst(s) can muster. It should be emphasized that the term 
'model' is used here in a very broad sense. It is not neces- 
sarily a computerized mathematical model; it may just be a 
collection of relevant knowledge, data and hypotheses. But this 
is still a model, not reality, and this fact should be stressed 
very strongly when examining the methodological implications of 
the basic prototype. The model is based on the analyst's per- 
ception of the decision problem, and this perception may be wrong, 
or inconsistent with that of the decision maker. Thus, 
the model should be validated before use. However, before this 
the model must first be built. 
The methodology-of model building is itself a separate sub- 
ject in systems analysis, with its own extensive literature [see, 
for example, Wierzbicki (1977) and Lewandowski and Wierzbicki 
(1982)l. Here we shall list only a few general principles. 
1. The ultimate purpose of the model should be the most 
important consideration in model building; the model should also 
be the simplest possible that serves the purpose. One of the 
most important tasks of model building is to identify the rele- 
vant information, hypotheses, etc. 
2. Models should be built in an iterative fashion, at each 
iteration developing and executing falsification tests examining 
internal consistency, consistency with other information, 
consistency with available empirical data, and consistency with 
new data gathered specifically for falsification purposes. 
3. ldodels should be built interactively, involving not only 
analysts but.also decision makers, so that the decision maker's 
perceptions of the problem, the relevant data, and the model 
validity can be taken into account. 
Unfortunately, these principles are not observed in many 
system-analytic studies, with multiobjective analysis being one 
of the worst offenders. A possible reason for this is that 
multiobjective analysis is often influenced by economic traditions, 
and it is known that the methodological principles of empirical 
science are sometimes not followed in economic studies [see, 
for example, a recent critical essay by Leontief ( 1 9 8 2 ) l .  How- 
ever, important as the subject is, this is no place for a de- 
tailed discussion of model building. We must assume that the 
substantive model of the problem has already been built and 
validated, and concentrate on the second stage: the use of the 
model to clarify the decision situation. 
Before we do this, however, it should be noted that the 
prototype situation shown in Figure l(a) is usually oversimplified. 
Much more common is the situation shown in Figure l(b), where 
there is an additional link, a senior analyst responsible for 
explaining the situation to the decision maker. In other cases 
ind.ividua1 experts may be involved in evaluating the alternatives 
proposed by the analysts, as in Figure.l(c), or a group of 
decision makers may be responsible for the final decision 
(Figure Id). The elements of these nontrivial variants of the 
first prototype can also be combined in other ways.--.In addition, 
the 'decision maker1 from Figure ?(a)-could actually be-a .'senior 
analyst' or '..experts or 'politician'-.- However, the main 
feature of this prototype is that decision-making is actually 
centralized, even if several parties have to agree upon the 
decision. 
ilow, it is the duty of the team of analysts not only to 
clarify the substantive aspects of the decision situation, but 
also to formulate proposals taking into account the institu- 
tional aspects of this situation, i.e., the characteristics of 
the political process that will lead to the actual decision. 
This principle is not generally followed in contemporary multi- 
objective analysis, where attention is concentrated primarily on 
the prototype situation from Figure l(a). However, there are 
some notable exceptions. 
One of the most common aspects of political processes is 
that neither the decision makers nor even the experts have much 
time to study the very detailed reports prepared by the analysts. 
Even if this is not the case (discussed later), the decision- 
making process is usually split into two phases. The first 
phase is usually performed by the team of analysts with some 
possible interaction from the decision maker, and involves the 
g e n e r a t i o n  of a small number of a l t e r n a t i v e s .  The second phase 
is the responsibility of the decision makers (possibly with the 
help of experts and senior analysts) and concerns the c h o i c e  
be tween a l t s r n a t i v e s .  Both phases have characteristic features. 
Clearly, the stronger the interaction with the decision 
makers in the first phase, the easier is the second phase. How- 
ever, in many situations the substantive model is not sufficiently 
formalized to allow easy interaction. A team of analysts can 
sometimes have no option but to generate (more or less intuitive- 
ly) a number of alternatives that seem professionally sound, and 
submit them to the decision makers. 
On the other hand, if the substantive model can be formulated 
in mathematical terms and computerized, and if the decision 
makers or experts or even the senior analyst can work inter- 
actively with the model to generate alternatives, the chances 
that the alternatives will be satisfactory are greatly improved. 
In such a case, it is important to computerize not only the sub- 
stantive model, but also an interactive decision support system 
to help the user work with the substantive model (see ~igure le). 
It is important to have a clear understanding of the role of 
interactive decision support systems in this situation. Firstly, 
they simulate the work of the team of analysts in Figure l(b), 
generating alternatives in response to the requirements of the 
senior analyst. A model user, although supported by the system, 
must either have some general analytical knowledge about the 
problem, or work with an analyst who helps him to interact with 
the model. Thus, Figure l(e) represents a situation functionally 
similar to that illustrated in the lower part of Figure l(b) but 
to none of the other cases considered previously. Secondly, the 
interactive decision support system enables the user to learn 
about possible alternatives, and assists him in choosing a set 
for the next stage of the decision process. This second phase, 
choice between alternatives, can very rarely be suppressed by 
making the decision via interaction with the model. With these 
qualifications, however, interactive decision support systems are 
much more effective than analysts trying to prepare alternatives 
for the decision maker without his participation. 
Thus, decision makers should be involved in the generation 
of alternatives; conversely, analysts should be involved in the 
decision making process. Although the choice between alternatives 
usually has some political character, this does not make it 
irrational; the analyst should try to understand the rationality 
of this phase and help to structure it. We should perhaps stress 
that we do not limit "rationality" to its traditional economic 
meaning; political processes have their own (mostly procedural) 
rationality, which arises from experience in making political 
and social decisions. The best example of procedural rationality 
is given by the procedures of evidence in courts of law and, 
more generally, by the rationality of law: this is built on long 
experience with-methods -of handling controversial evidence and 
social disputes. An analyst who understands the rationality of 
the underlying processes is in a better position to represent 
the substantive aspects of the problem.. 
Although there are several methods of multiobjective.ana1y- 
sls that can help the analyst to clarify differences of opinion 
between experts [Keeney and Raiffa (1976)], or even to obtain 
consensus between decision makers [Rietveld (1980)], most of 
these methods are based on classical notions of economic 
rationality. A study of procedural rationality and its possible 
applications in multiobjective decision making would be an 
important complement to existing methods for multiobjective 
analysis. 
2.2 The Role of Uncertainty: Normative Core and 
Procedural Belt in Policy Analaysis 
Before considering more prototype decision situations, we 
should perhaps discuss the role of uncertainty in decision making 
and its impact on planning and policy analysis. 
The word 'uncertainty' has two meanings, one mathematical 
and the other empirical. Mathematically, uncertainty is usually 
understood in a probabilistic sense: it is represented by some 
a priori probability distribution which can be modified when 
additional information becomes available. The basic drawback of 
this representation is that a probabilistic model actually re- 
quires much more information than a nonprobabilistic one, because 
our assumptions about the probability distribution and its param- 
eters must be validated experimentally. This drawback could be 
overcome by formulating subjective probability models; however, 
the question of empirical falsification then becomes even more 
critical. Other techniques that overcome this problem include 
simple interval characterization with subsequent interval analy- 
sis, and their extension by fuzzy set theory- 
Empirically, uncertainty is a much broader concept. When 
building a model, the analyst might consciously neglect several 
factors that he considers to be either irrelevant or not suf- 
ficiently understood to be modelled. These neglected or un- 
predictable factors cannot necessarily be represented by a prob- 
abilistic model or even by interval.characterization. 
Before we can examine the effects of uncertainty on planning 
and policy analysis, we first have to consider what these terms 
actually mean. Most definitions of planning are in basic agree- 
ment [see, for example, Dror (1963)l: "planning is the process 
of preparing a set of decisions for action in the future, directed 
at achieving goals by preferable means". However, there is 
greater disagreement on-the definition of policy. Ranney,(1968) 
states that "policy is a course of action conceived as deliberately 
adopted, after a review of possible alternatives, and pursued or 
intended to be pursued", but many other definitions stress either 
the political process of policy formulation or the implementation 
aspects. iqonetheless, there is a great similarity in the defi- 
nitions of planning and policy. As a basis for discussion, 
therefore, we shall assume that planning is the process of policy 
formulation or policy specification (in the case when a higher- 
level policy is accepted as a basis for more detailed planning), 
while the concept of policy includes both formulation and imple- 
mentation aspects. 
To obtain a comprehensive definition of a policy, we will 
distinguish between two types of uncertainty: predictable un- 
certainty and unpredictable uncertainty. The first can be in- 
cluded in a model by probabilistic means, supported by empirical 
data, while the second should be understood in a pragmatic and 
semantic (rather than syntactic) sense: due to lack of 
empirical data, or because of model simplifications, we accept 
that there are aspects of the problem that cannot be predicted 
in the basic model that we intend to use for policy analysis. 
Having made this distinction, we can now define the various 
elements that comprise a policy (see Figure 2a). 
The first of these elements is the substantive content of 
policy--selected knowledge about real situation (economic, 
ecological, technological, regional) addressed by the policy; 
the second is the political process--the institutional and 
sociopolitical aspects of policy formation and implementation. 
Both of these elements are included in the analysis only to a 
limited degree: both involve neglected, unpredictable or un- 
known factors as well as known or predictable factors. For 
this reason, the-concept of policy-also contains two other 
elements: a normative core and a procedural belt. The normative 
core includes-everything that is known and predictable about the 
policy content and political process; the procedural belt des- 
cribes implementation procedures for handling the neglected and 
unpredictable - aspects. 
While the concepts of policy content and political process 
are well-known in policy analysis, the concepts of the normative 
c o r e  and p r o c e d u r a l  b e l t  a r e  newl)and r e q u i r e  f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n .  
There a r e  many r e a s o n s  f o r  i n t r o d u c i n g  t h e s e  i d e a s :  f o r e x a m p l e ,  
t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  on t h e  m e r i t s  o f  v a r i o u s  p lann ing  approaches 
( b l u e p r i n t  v e r s u s  p r o c e s s  p lann ing ,  e t c .  ) i s  c l e a r l y  r e l a t e d  t o  
t h e  l a c k  of any d i s t i n c t i o n  between what w e  c a l l  t h e  normat ive  
c o r e  and t h e  p r o c e d u r a l  b e l t  o f  a p o l i c y .  R a t i o n a l  comprehensive 
p lann ing  i s  c l e a r l y  concerned w i t h  t h e  normat ive  c o r e  a s p e c t s  o f  
a p o l i c y :  set a g o a l  and d e c i d e  i n  g e n e r a l  how t o  a c h i e v e  it, 
assuming t h a t  t h e  world w i l l  behave a s  p r e d i c t e d .  However, i f  
any th ing  can go wrong, it w i l l :  some a s p e c t s  a r e  always n e g l e c t e d  
o r  u n p r e d i c t a b l e  and must be d e a l t  wi th  by p rov id ing  s p e c i f i c  
implementat ion p rocedures  a s  w e l l  a s  g e n e r a l  normative d i r e c t i o n s ,  
and by a u t h o r i z i n g  a 'man on t h e  s p o t '  t o  d e a l  w i t h  developing 
s i t u a t i o n s  a s  he  f i n d s  a p p r o p r i a t e .  
There z r e  many a r e a s  of  human a c t i v i t y  i n  which much t i m e  i s  
s p e n t  c o n s i d e r i n g  what couZd go wrong and i n  d e v i s i n g  p r o c e d u r a l  
r e sponses ,  i . e . ,  emphasis i s  on t h e  p r o c e d u r a l  b e l t .  For  example, 
one o f  t h e  l e s s o n s  of t h e  Three M i l e  I s l a n d  n u c l e a r  r e a c t o r  
a c c i d e n t  was t h a t  t h e  o p e r a t i n g  procedures  w e r e  n o t  r i c h  enough; 
a n o t h e r  was t h a t  t h e  pe r sonne l  were n o t  t r a i n e d  i n  v a r i o u s  e m e r -  
gency a c t i o n s .  Consider  t h e  c a s e  of  t h e  shop owner who s a y s  " i t  
is  o u r  p o l i c y  n o t  t o  a c c e p t  cheques":  it i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  common 
language i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  ' p o l i c y '  i n c l u d e s  t h e  p r o c e d u r a l  b e l t  
an6 even c o n c e n t r a t e s  on  it. I n  economics, many-widely d i s p u t e d  
i s s u e s ,  such a s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  advantages  o f  market and p lanned 
economies, a r e  r e a l l y  r e l a t e d  more t o  t h e  r o b u s t n e s s  o f  t h e  pro-  
c e d u r a l  b e l t  t h a n  t o  t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  t h e  normative core .  (However, 
because  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n - n a d  n o t  been made, an6 because t h e r e  w e r e  
no mathemat ica l  t o o l s  f o r  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  t h e  p rocedura l  b e l t ,  it was 
t r i e d  u n s u c c e s s f u l l y  t o  se t t l e  t h e s e  i s s u e s  by i n v e s t i g a t i n g  t h e  
normative c o r e ; )  -In c o n t r o l  s c i e n c e s ,  p r o c e d u r a l  b e l t  i s s u e s  cor respond  
' h h e s e  concep t s  w e r e  formula ted  by t h e  a u t h o r  d u r i n g  d i s -  
c u s s i o n s  w i t h  Nino blajone a t  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  
Applied Systems A n a l y s i s  i n  e a r l y  1982, and a r e  analogous t o  t h e  
concepts- .of  a normat ive  c o r e  and p r o t e c t i v e  b e l t  i n  s c i e n t i f i c  
programs i n t r o d u c e d  by Lakatosh - ( 1 9 7 8 ) .  
to the problems of stabilizing feedback systems, and these have 
been investigated quite widely. However, in only a few cases 
[e.g., Wierzbicki (1977)l is a mode of analysis adopted that 
could encompass both the normative core and the procedural belt. 
Now, how can we investigate something that is unpredictable? 
In the same way that we train pilots: by imagining the most 
dangerous--if improbable--situations that can develop, and ex- 
posing the pilots to them on a flight simulator. In terms of 
building models for decision analysis, this approach would mean 
constructing two mode l s  (see Figure 2b) : a b a s i c  model and an 
ex tended  model .  The first represents the known and predictable, 
while the second contains possible answers to the question: which 
of the aspects of reality neglected in the basic model could have 
the most negative impact on the implementation of the policy? 
It should be stressed that the extended model is not a better 
representation of reality, it is simply a different representa- 
tion of reality, a falsification hypothesis constructed to check 
the robustness of the conclusions derived from the basic model. 
When checking this robustness, we would really like to know 
which implementation procedure to choose; there are usualiy many 
implementation procedures that are consistent with the course of 
action suggested in the basic model, but these procedures might 
give quite different results when applied to an extended model. 
Thls framework.imrnediately_suggests  several research.ques- 
tions. First, how should implementation procedures be generated? 
Second, how should the consistency of an implementation procedure 
with respect to the basic model (normative core) be characterized? 
Third, how -should the robustness of an implementation-procedure 
be defined operationally?. .The most natural defi-nition would be 
the losses that result from the fact that the policy was devised 
using the basic model rather than the extended one. However, 
this might not be feasible, since it would involve deriving the 
normative policy for each extended model, and then comparing the 
results of applying two policies to the extended model (one 
policy should be derived from the basic model, with some imple- 
mentation procedure, and the other derived from the extended 
model). If such simulation experiments are to be performed on 
s e v e r a l  ex tended  models,  t h e  t i m e  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  r o b u s t n e s s  ana ly -  
s is  might be  e x c e s s i v e .  Th i s  r e s u l t s  i n  f u r t h e r  q u e s t i o n s :  How 
could  w e  make such  a  d e f i n i t i o n  o p e r a t i o n a l ?  How should  we o r -  
gan ize  r o b u s t n e s s  a n a l y s i s ?  Are t h e r e  any mathemat ica l  methods 
t h a t  would e n a b l e  u s  t o  compare t h e  r o b u s t n e s s  o f  v a r i o u s  imple- 
menta t ion  p r o c e d u r e s  w i t h o u t  r e q u i r i n g  many s o l u t i o n s  f o r  t h e  
extended model and t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  i t s  normat ive  p o l i c y  c o r e s ?  
I t  t u r n s  o u t  t h a t  a l l  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s  have a n  answer,  a t  
l e a s t  f o r  s i n g l e - o b j e c t i v e  d e c i s i o n  problems [Wie rzb ick i  ( 1 9 7 7 ) ,  
Snower and W i e r z b i c k i  ( 1 9 8 2 ) l ;  whether t h e s e  r e s u l t s  can  be  ex- 
t ended  t o  t h e  n u l t l o b j e c t i v e  c a s e  remains u n c e r t a i n .  
For some models ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h o s e  o f  a p r o b a b i l i s t i c  n a t u r e ,  
t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between t h e  normative and t h e  p r o c e d u r a l  a s p e c t s  
of  a  p o l i c y  can  be  less sharp .  For example, i f  we have a  s tochas -  
t i c  p r o c e s s  model we can  d e r i v e  t h e  o p t i m a l  feedback  p o l i c y ,  
which s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a unique b e s t  method o f  implement- 
i n g  t h e  p o l i c y .  W e  c o u l d  go even f u r t h e r :  assume a s t o c h a s t i c  
p r o c e s s  model w i t h  some parameters  t h a t  are  n o t  known a p r i o r i ,  
and d e r i v e  an a d a p t i v e  op t imal  feedback p o l i c y ,  i . e . ,  a p rocedure  
t h a t  bo th  r e s p o n d s  t o  p e r t u r b a t i o n s  and can  l e a r n  by accumula t ing  
in fo rma t ion  [ s e e  Walters (1981) f o r  an e m p i r i c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  
t h i s  mathemat ica l  i d e a ] .  Su re ly  t h i s  would be e q u i v a l e n t  t o  a 
j o i n t  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  normat ive  and p r o c e d u r a l  a s p e c t s  o f  a 
p o l i c y ,  and ,  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  i s  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  r e a l l y  necessary?-  
I n  b o t h  o f  t h e  above c a s e s ,  w e  r e a l l y  assume p r e d i c t a b i l i t y :  
t h e  world w i l l  behave l a r g e l y  a s  we e x p e c t ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  may 
be  some n a s t y  s t o c h a s t i c  e f f e c t s  and we c a n n o t  p r e d i c t  i t s  be- 
h a v i o r  f u l l y .  - T h e r e  i s  no p l a c e  h e r e  f o r  r e a l l y  u n p r e d i c t a b l e  
e v e n t s ,  no room f o r .  . any th ing  t o  go. wrong. Thus, a l t hough .  t h e s e  
c a s e s  i n c l u d e  some p r o c e d u r a l  f e a t u r e s ,  t h e y  r e a l l y  l i e  i n  t h e  
normat ive  c o r e :  t h e  unique op t imal  feedback  p o l i c y  might  t u r n  
o u t  t o  b e  wrong i f  t h e r e  w a s  some u n p r e d i c t a b l e  parameter  change 
o f  a  t y p e  n o t  assumed i n  t h e  b a s i c  model. T h i s  is  a known pa ra -  
dox i n  c o n t r o l  t h e o r y :  t h e  op t ima l  s t o c h a s t i c  feedback p o l i c y  
s u g g e s t s  p r o p o r t i o n a l  c o n t r o l l e r  forms,  a l t h o u g h  a g r e a t  d e a l  o f  
expe r imen ta l  e v i d e n c e  shows t h a t  i f  w e  a r e  t o  a c h i e v e  r o b u s t n e s s  
we must p a r t l y  n e g l e c t  o p t i m a l i t y  and a d o p t ,  f o r  example, 
p r o p o r t i o n a l - i n t e g r a l  c o n t r o l l e r  forms. Th i s  i m p l i e s  a  mu l t i -  
o b j e c t i v e  approach:  i f  t h e r e  i s  a  unique implementat ion p rocedure  
t h a t  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  normat ive  c o r e  o f  a  p o l i c y ,  w e  might  
a c c e p t  a  d e c r e a s e  i n  t h e  normative e f f i c i e n c y  of  a n o t h e r  proce-  
d u r e  if it g u a r a n t e e s  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  i n c r e a s e  i n  r o b u s t n e s s  i n  un- 
p r e d i c t a b l e  c a s e s .  F i n a l l y ,  w e  should  stress t h a t  e f f i c i e n c y  
and r o b u s t n e s s  might  n o t  be  t h e  on ly  o b j e c t i v e s ;  ano the r  could  b e  
a d a p t a b i l i t y ,  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  l e a r n  from expe r i ence .  Thus, w e  
might t r y  t o  d e s i g n  p o l i c i e s  i n  a  way t h a t  t a k e s  a l l  t h r e e  
o b j e c t i v e s  i n t o  account .  
A f t e r  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  of  t h e  p r o c e d u r a l  b e l t  and normat ive  
c o r e ,  it would perhaps  be u s e f u l  t o  f o r m u l a t e  a n  ex tended  d e f i -  
n i t i o n  o f  p o l i c y .  P o l i c y  i s  a  c o u r s e  o f  a c t i o n ,  assumed t o  i n -  
c l u d e  a  b a s i c  normat ive  d i r e c t i o n  and p r o c e d u r a l  implementat ion 
r u l e s ,  which has  been d e l i b e r a t e l y  adopted  a f t e r  review of 
p o s s i b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  and assessment  o f  p r e d i c t a b l e  and un- 
p r e d i c t a b l e  a s p e c t s  o f  bo th  s u b s t a n t i v e  c o n t e n t  and p o l i t i c a l  
p roces s .  T h i s  d e f i n i t i o n ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  framework d i s c u s s e d  
above,  s t i l l  l e a v e s  many q u e s t i o n s  f o r  r e s e a r c h ;  however, it 
seems t o  be  a c o n s t r u c t i v e  p o i n t  o f  e n t r y  t o  many impor t an t  
problems. For  example, t h e  i s s u e  o f  ' p r o c e s s  p l ann ing '  can 
c l e a r l y  b e  i n v e s t i g a t e d  i n  what w e  cal l  t h e  p rocedura l  b e l t  o f  
p o l i c y .  
2 .3  Second Pro to type :  Decis ions  of Independent Actors  
Dec i s ions  are o f t e n  made by independent  a c t o r s  ( o r  ' p l a y e r s ' )  
who, b e a r i n g  i n  mind t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  behav io r  o f  o t h e r  a c t o r s  
might i n f l u e n c e  t h e  f i n a l  outcome, must choose whether  t o  a c t  
i ndependen t ly  o r  t o  a g r e e  on j o i n t  a c t i o n  w i t h - o t h e r s .  T y p i c a l  
examples are .two n a t i o n s  n e g o t i a t i n g  t r a d e  agreements ,  o r  two 
r e g i o n a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  one d e a l i n g  w i t h  e c o l o g i c a l  p r o t e c t i o n ,  
t h e  o t h e r  w i t h  i n d u s t r i a l  development. 
T h i s  s i t u a t i o n  i s  t y p i c a l l y  r e p r e s e n t e d  by t h e  p r o t o t y p e  i n  
F i g u r e  3 ( a ) .  However, a l t hough  t h i s  p r o t o t y p e  h a s  been s t u d i e d  
i n  some d e p t h  (see l a t e r  s e c t i o n s ) ,  it i s  n o t  a good r e p r e s e n t a -  
t i o n  o f  a t y p i c a l  d e c i s i o n  s i t u a t i o n  s i n c e  it assumes t h a t  
, d e c i s i o n s  are p r e p a r e d ,  e v a l u a t e d  and implemented d i r e c t l y  
by t h e  p r i n c i p a l  a c t o r s  o r  d e c i s i o n  makers. Much more r e a l i s t i c  
p r o t o t y p e s  are i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  F igu res  3 (b)  and 3 (c)  . Here t h e  
d e c i s i o n  a n a l y s i s  i s  performed by teams o f  a n a l y s t s ,  p o s s i b l y  
wi th  s e n i o r  a n a l y s t s  s e r v i n g  as l i n k s  between t h e  t e a m s  and t h e  
p r i n c i p a l  a c t o r s .  
The s i t u a t i o n s  i n  F igu res  3 ( a ) ,  3 (b) and 3 (c) may be g r e a t l y  
complicated by antagonism between t h e  a c t o r s .  Actors  and a n a l y s t s  
who have common g o a l s  o r  s h a r e  a c u l t u r a l  background (whether it 
be  p o l i t i c a l ,  d i s c i p l i n a r y  o r  whatever)  can a g r e e  r e l a t i v e l y  
q u i c k l y  on some common model of  t h e  problem. They would s h a r e  
t h e i r  s u b s t a n t i v e  knowledge o f  t h e  problem, a l though t h e y  may 
wi thho ld ,  f o r  s t r a t e g i c  r easons ,  i n fo rma t ion  about  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
a s p e c t s  o r  about  t h e i r  r e a l  goa l s .  Th i s  s t r a t e g i c  a s p e c t  o f  
i n fo rma t ion  i s  r e a l l y  t h e  most impor tan t  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  
c e n t r a l i z e d  s i t u a t i o n ,  i n  which a l l  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  assumed t o  
be  sha red ,  and s i t u a t i o n s  invo lv ing  independent  a c t o r s ,  i n  which 
any i n f o r n a t i o n  g iven  t o  o t h e r  a c t o r s  might change t h e  outcome 
o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  p r o c e s s .  
I n - h i g h l y  a n t a g o n i s t i c  s i t u a t i o n s  it i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  
t e a m s  of  a n a l y s t s  canno t  a g r e e  on a j o i n t  model of t h e  s u b s t a n t i v e  
a s p e c t s  of  t h e  problem, o r  do n o t  want t o  exchange s u b s t a n t i v e  
in fo rma t ion  because  even t h i s  might b e  t o o  r e v e a l i n g .  I f  a 
j o i n t  d e c i s i o n  a n a l y s i s  i s  n e c e s s a r y  i n  a s i t u a t i o n  where t h e  
a c t o x s  come from complete ly  d i f f e r e n t  c u l t u r a l  backgrounds ( n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  from d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s ;  I have observed  t h a t  even 
economists  from d i f f e r e n t  p o l i t i c a l  backgrounds unders tand  
each  o t h e r  b e t t e r  t h a n ,  say, an economist  and a lawyer  from t h e  
same u n i v e r s i t y ) . ,  t h e n  a n e u t r a l  media tor  (see F igu re  3d) h a s  t o  
be  employed,-even t o - a s s i s t  i n  j o i n t  mode l .bu i ld ing .  Such 
media t ions  might r e s u l t  i n  a model t h a t  i n c o r p o r a t e s  t h e  models 
o f  a l l  i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s ;  however, t h e  v a r i o u s  p a r t i e s  may o r  
may n o t  a g r e e  t o  t h e  media tor  t r a n s f e r r i n g  in fo rma t ion  abou t  
t h e i r  models t o  t h e  o t h e r  p a r t i e s .  ( C l e a r l y ,  a media tor  could  
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  b e ~ c o r r u p t e d  by some p a r t y ;  b u t  i f  h i s  p r e s t i g e  
and o t h e r  b e n e f i t s  depend on t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s . b e i n g  s u c c e s s f u l ,  
he h a s  a  s t r o n g  i n c e n t i v e  t o  remain n e u t r a l - - i f  h i s  b i a s  w e r e  
d e t e c t e d  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  might be broken o f f ) .  
During j o i n t  d e c i s i o n  a n a l y s i s  o r  a c t u a l  n e g o t i a t i o n ,  t h e  
r o l e  of  a  n e u t r a l  m e d i a t o r  would be even more impor t an t .  Empir- 
i c a l  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  [see, f o r  example, F i s h e r  and 
Ury (1981) l  .shows t h a t , .  a l t hough  t h e  i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s  do n o t  
l i k e  t o  d i s c l o s e  t h e i r  r e a l  i n t e r e s t s  t o  each  o t h e r ,  a  med ia to r  
o f t e n  f i n d s  t h a t  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  n o t  as  a n t a g o n i s t i c  a s  t h e y  
s u s p e c t ,  and t h a t  a t t r a c t i v e  compromises a r e  p o s s i b l e .  T h i s  
e m p i r i c a l  e v i d e n c e  c o n t r a d i c t s  t h e  u s u a l  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  an t ag -  
o n i s t s ,  who t e n d  t o  b e l i e v e  t h e  wors t  o f  t h e i r  opponents  and 
view n e g o t i a t i o n s  as  a  zero-sum game i n  which t h e y  s h o u l d  t a k e  
ha rd  p o s i t i o n s  and have  a d e f i n i t e ,  s i n g l e  o b j e c t i v e  mind. 
However, i f  l i f e  w e r e  r e a l l y  l i k e  t h i s  even t h e  s i m p l e s t  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  o v e r  p r i c e s  would a lmos t  a lways b e  u n s u c c e s s f u l .  
For ,  i f  b o t h  se l l e r  and buyer  had t h e  s i n g l e  o b j e c t i v e s ,  s a y ,  
o f  c h a r g i n g  no l e s s  and pay ing  no more t h a n  t h e  market  v a l u e ,  
t h e y  cou ld  a g r e e  o n l y  on  t h e  c u r r e n t  market  p r i c e ,  w i t h o u t  p r o f i t  
f o r  e i t h e r  o f  them; t h e r e  would be no r ea son  f o r  t h e  g e n e r a l  
o b s e r v a t i o n  t h a t  b o t h  t h e  buyer  and t h e  sel ler  conc lude  t h e  
b a r g a i n i n g  w i t h  a  f e e l i n g  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n .  To e x p l a i n  t h i s  
e f f e c t ,  it i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  assume t h a t  b o t h  s i d e s  are working 
w i t h  more t h a n  one  o b j e c t i v e .  The buyer  might  want a  p r e s e n t  
f o r  h i s  w i f e ,  h e  migh t  have t aken  a  fancy t o  t h e  o b j e c t  i n  ques-  
t i o n ,  o r  h e  migh t  b e  a c o l l e c t o r  who needs t h e  o b j e c t  t o  comple t e  
h i s  co l l ec t ion . - - .  T h e - s e l l e r  m i g h t  n o t  have had any 
customers  t h a t  day,  migh t  have l i q u i d i t y  problems,  o r  might  
want t o  renew h i s  s t o c k .  Thus, t h e r e  i s  n o t  a  s i n g l e  p r i c e ,  
b u t  a range  o f  p r i c e s  a t  which bo th  s i d e s  would conc lude  t h e  
barga in ing- - the  r i t u a l  o f  b a r g a i n i n g  d i r e c t s  t h e  p r i c e - t o  t h i s  
range  by g r a d u a l l y . . d i s c l o s i n g  t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f - - i n t e r e s t s  on e i t h e r  
s i d e .  
I t  shou ld  b e  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  o u r  a n a l y t i c a l  unde r s t and ing  
o f  t h e  m u l t i o b j e c t i v e ,  m u l t i p a r t y  d e c i s i o n  s i t u a t i o n  i s  as  y e t  
r a t h e r  poor  (see l a t e r  s e c t i o n s ) ,  and h a s  begun t o  improve o n l y  
. . 
r e c e n t l y  [ R a i f f a  (1982)J. Much work has  y e t  t o  b e  done i f  w e  
are t o  d e s c r i b e  s u c h  s i t u a t i o n s  a n a l y t i . c a l l y .  
2 .4  Third Prototype:  H i e r a r c h i c a l  Decisions 
Although it h a s  l o n g  been recognized t h a t  d e c i s i o n s  are made 
w i t h i n  h i e r a r . c h i c a 1  s t r u c t u r e s ,  t h e  p r o t o t y p e  d e c i s i o n  s i t u a t i o n s  
i n  which t h e  h i e r a r c h y  of  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  i n v e s t i g a t e d  have u n t i l  
now been i n f l u e n c e d  more by t h e  s y n t a c t i c  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  
language o f  mathematics  t h a n  by t h e i r  semant ic  r e l e v a n c e .  Two 
p r o t o t y p e s  have r e c e i v e d  p a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n t i o n .  The f i r s t  assumes 
f u l l y  c o o r d i n a t e d  i n t e r e s t s  and s i n g l e  o b j e c t i v e s ,  and i s  such  
t h a t  an uppe r - l eve l  d e c i s i o n  maker can i n f l u e n c e  and modify t h e  
( s i n g l e )  o b j  e c t i v e s  of  v a r i o u s  lower- leve l  d e c i s i o n  makers 
(F igu re  4 a ) ,  t h u s  maximizing h i s  own o b j e c t i v e .  The second 
p ro to type  assumes s h a r e d  informat ion ,  noncoord ina ted  i n t e r e s t s  
and s i n g l e  o b j e c t i v e s ,  and i s  such t h a t  an  uppe r - l eve l  d e c i s i o n  
maker cannot  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  lower- level  d e c i s i o n  makers b u t  i s  
f u l l y  informed o f  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  ( s i n g l e  o b j e c t i v e s ) ;  h e  can  
p l a n  h i s  moves t o  maximize h i s  o b j e c t i v e  assuming t h a t  t h e  lower- 
l e v e l  d e c i s i o n  makers make c e r t a i n  responses  ( s e e  F i g u r e  4 b ) .  
The f i r s t  p r o t o t y p e  began w i t h  t h e  Dantzig-Wolfe decomposi t ion 
p r i n c i p l e  [see Dantz ig  and Wolfe (1960) and F inde r sen  e t  a l .  
( 1 9 8 0 ) ] ,  t h e  second w i t h  t h e  concept of  S t a c k e l b e r g  e q u i l i b r i u m  
i n  game t h e o r y  [ s e e  S tacke lbe rg  (1 938) and Germeer (1976) 1 ; bo th  
have s i n c e  been t h e  s u b j e c t  of  very c o n s i d e r a b l e  t h e o r e t i c a l  
i n t e r e s t  w i t h  o n l y  l i m i t e d  success  i n  a p p l i c a t i o n s .  
Although t h e r e  has -been- some-a t t empt  a t - h i e r a r c h i c a l  m u l t i -  
o b j e c t i v e  a n a l y s i s  [see Seo and Sakawa (-1 980) 1 o n l y  l i m i t e d  
a t t e n t i o n  h a s  been p a i d  t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of  u s e f u l  p r o t o t y p e  
s i t u a t i o n s .  I f  we-assume f u l l  c o o r d i n a t i o n  as  i n  t h e  f i r s t  
h i e r a r c h i c a l  p r o t o t y p e  ( t h e  h i e r a r c h i c a l '  o p t i m i z a t i o n  p r o t o t y p e )  , 
w e  must a l s o - d e s c r i b e - t h e  means by which t h e  uppe r - l eve l  d e c i s i o n  
maker i n f l u e n c e s  t h e  c h o i c e s  and p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  t h e  lower - l eve l  
d e c i s i o n  makers. It i s  q u e s t i o n a b l e  whether  w e  cou ld  a d o p t  t h e  
assumptions  o f  t h e  second h i e r a r c h i c a l  p r o t o t y p e  ( t h e  h i e r a r c h i c a l  
game p r o t o t y p e )  w i t h o u t  m o d i f i c a t i o n s ,  s i n c e  t h e  assumption t h a t  
t h e  h i g h e r - l e v e l  d e c i s i o n  maker has  f u l l  i n f o r m a t i o n  on t h e  
p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  t h e  lower - l eve l ,  i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  independent  
d e c i s i o n  makers is n o t  u s u a l l y  j u s t i f i e d  by e m p i r i c a l  ev idence .  
Much more r e s e a r c h  based  on e m s i r i c a l  f a l s i f i c a t i o n  t e s t s  must 
be done before we can formulate prototypes for hierarchical 
decision situations that are both realistic and mathematically 
tractable. 
3. MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTS IN MULTIOBJECTIVE ANALYSIS 
Even a short discussion of the mathematical foundations of 
multiobjective analysis would require a book rather than a short 
paper. Thus, we will not even attempt to explain these founda- 
tions here, just sinply state that they are syntactically quite well 
developed. Instead, we will discuss the semantic usefulness of 
some of the basic concepts underlying these mathematical methods, 
and explain the possible syntactic difficulties of making these 
concepts more meaningful. 
We start with the concept of Pareto optimality. A Pareto- 
optimal decision is one in which no objective or outcome of 
interest can be improved without worsening other outcomes of 
interest. Observe that this definition depends critically on 
the completeness of the list of outcomes of interest (objectives): 
if the list is incomplete, the 'best' decision may not be Pareto- 
optimal for the incomplete list, because we could worsen all the 
objectives on the list in order to improve an unlisted objective. 
This observation has two interpretations: one, tautological, is 
that any decision could be considered Pareto-optimal if we choose 
the objectives carefully enough; the second, empirical, is that 
we could, under certain additional assumptions, identify the un- 
stated objectives of decision makers who prefer 
seemingly Pareto-inferior decisions. This empirical interpreta- 
tion makes the concept of Pareto-optimality richer and more use-. 
ful, although more.Yheoretica1 research is needed on the condi- 
tions under which unstated outcomes of interest can be identified. 
The second basic concept is that of expressing preferences 
by utility functions. This concept, while very important syn- 
tactically [Debreu ( 1 9 5 9 )  ] , --has rather. limited semantic useful- 
ness: many empirical tests in mathematical psychology which 
have tried to identify the utilit-y functions of human decision. 
makers have had very limited success [Tvershy ( 1  972) 1 . Some 
defenders of this concept try to use a tautological argument 
similar to that concerning Pareto-optimality: people do behave 
as if they were maximizing a utility function, only this function 
may depend on more variables than we first thought. Since there 
is an infinite number of functions of various variables that 
could have a maximum at any chosen decision, this defence cannot 
be falsified, except in a very concrete situation when we try to 
identify the additional variables, postulate a limited class of 
utility functions, and run a specific falsification test; however, 
most of the known attempts to do this have given rather indeter- 
minate results. We should rather try to accept the fact that 
utility functions are purely mathematical constructs, very use- 
ful whenever we can substantiate their use in a concrete case, 
but always demanding a careful empirical justification. Many 
related concepts in mathematical multiobjective analysis, such 
as the ideas of weighting coefficients and trade-off coefficients, 
are subject to the same qualification: while mathematically 
elegant and possibly useful for an analyst, they do not mean 
anything in applications until checked empirically. This point 
has been the subject of long and heated discussions: analysts 
who use certain mathematical concepts extensively are apt to 
believe that these concepts have some independent existence in 
the real world. 
However, there have also been notable-successes in devel- 
oping alternative- 'basic1-- concepts. The concept of - '.satisficing' 
decision making -[see Simon (1958)l assumes that people set up 
aspiration ZeveZs for various outcomes of interests, modify them 
as they accumulate more information, and then make decisions that 
satisfy or come close -to these aspiration levels. Although sub- 
stantiated by much empirical evidence, this concept-generated 
only limited mathematical interest, and thus had only a limited 
impact on mathematical decision theory and mathematical psychol- 
cgy. However, many of the methods of multiobjective analysis, 
such as the displaced ideal point approach [Zeleny (1974)l and 
goal programming [Charnes and Cooper [1977)] have more or less 
consciously adopted this concept. A generalized approach that 
combines the satisficing and aspiration level concepts with 
mathematical optimization has been proposed by Wierzbicki (1980). 
This approach concentrates on the construction of modified 
utility functions called ach ievemen t  f u n c t i o n s  that express the 
utility or disutility of reaching or not reaching given aspira- 
ti01 levels. These aspiration levels are either formed by 
expt ,ience, or established by an accepted authority (say, when 
a wife gives a shopping list to her husband, or when a boss in a 
team-like organization proposes goals for his staff). This type 
of modified utility function is much more likely to be validated 
empirically than the classical, context-free utility function, 
since the specification of aspiration levels involves analysis of 
the variables of interest and 
of the problem; the achievement function is only used to measure 
deviations from the agreed aspiration point. However, this con- 
cept has not yet been tested empirically; it has been used more 
to define the success of an interactive decision support system 
in responding to.the wishes of a user (see Figure le). This 
technique is often referred to as the 'reference point method' 
[see Grauer et al. (1 982) and Grauer and Lewandowski (1 982) 1 . 
3.1 Mathematical Tools for the Multiobjective Analysis 
of Centralized Decisions 
There are a large number of mathematical tools based on 
multiobjective optimization that can be used for generating 
alternative-s in the-first stage of multiobjective analysis. The 
most advanced tools available are for the situation in which the 
underlying substantive model can be represented as linear 
program with many objectives, simply because there are many 
reliable codes for-linear programming. [See Evans and Steuer 
(1973), Ecker and Kuada (1978), Yu and Zeleny (1975), Gal (1977, 
1979), Gal and Leberling (1977, 1981) and Iserman (1974) for 
various approaches to multiobj ective linear programming. 1 How- 
ever, many of these methods can also be extended to nonlinear 
models or discrete optimization models provided a good nonlinear 
or discrete programming code is available [see, for example, 
Grauer et al, (1982)l. The main issues in using multiobjective 
optimization techniques to generate alternatives relate more ko 
other aspects of the problem: the number of objectives and 
treatment of dynamic models, the way in which alternatives 
a r e  s e l e c t e d  f o r  p r e s e n t a t i o n  t o  d e c i s i o n  makers,  t h e  way i n  
which i n t e r a c t i o n  is  o rgan ized  i n  t h e  i n t e r a c t i v e  d e c i s i o n  sup- 
p o r t  sys tems ,  and t h e  way i n  which p o s s i b l e  u n l i s t e d  o b j e c t i v e s  
are t r e a t e d .  
Nan-interactive methods of  g e n e r a t i n g  a l t e r n a t i v e s  canno t  
handle  ve ry  many o b j e c t i v e s ,  s i n c e  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  shou ld  i n  
some s e n s e  cove r  t h e  P a r e t o  se t  which, i n  an n-dimensional  
o b j e c t i v e  s p a c e ,  i s  t y p i c a l l y  an  (n  - 1)-d imens iona l  mani fo ld .  
Thus, t h e  number o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t h a t  i n  some s e n s e  r e p r e s e n t s  
n- 1  t h e  P a r e t o  se t  grows e x p o n e n t i a l l y ,  s ay  a s  a  , w i t h  t h e  number 
of  o b j e c t i v e s .  I f  w e  use  dynamic models and c o n c e n t r a t e  on 
t r a j e c t o r i e s  a s  outcomes o r  o b j e c t i v e s ,  t h e  number o f  o b j e c t i v e s  
i n c r e a s e s  c o n s i d e r a b l y  ( s i n c e  each  p o i n t  on a t r a j e c t o r y  i s  
t e c h n i c a l l y  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  a n  o b j e c t i v e ) .  
T h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  c a s e  i n  i n t e r a c t i v e  methods, p a r t i c u l a r l y  
t h o s e  based  on a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  [see Zeleny (1 976) , Dyer (1 972) , 
I g n i z i o  (1 976) , and Grauer  e t  a l .  (1 982) 1 . The r eason  f o r  t h i s  
i s  t h a t  i n  each  i n t e r a c t i v e  i t e r a t i o n ,  t h e  u s e r  i s  p r e s e n t e d  w i t h  
o n l y  a  s m a l l  number o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  which cor responds  t o  t h e  
c u r r e n t  a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s .  The number of  o b j e c t i v e s  i s  t h e n  
l i m i t e d  by t h e  p r o c e s s i n g  c a p a b i l i t i e s  of  t h e  human mind-- 
e s t a b l i s h e d  e x p e r i m e n t a l l y  i n  psychology as  between f i v e  and 
n i n e .  S i n c e  t h e  human mind p r o c e s s e s  'by g e s t a l t ' ,  t h e s e  
o b j e c t i v e s  may. be. numbers or t r a j e c t o r i e s  (each  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  - o f  - 
a n  u n l i m i t e d  number o f  p o i n t s ) ,  s o  t h a t  dynamic models do n o t  
p r e s e n t  any p a r t i c u l a r  problems i n  t h e  i n t e r a c t i v e  mode. T h i s  
o b s e r v a t i o n  [Wie rzb ick i  (1980) l  h a s  r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  
o f  t h e  ach ievement . func t ion  method t o  many dynamic problems 
[Grauer  e t  . a l .  ( 1982) , , .Grauer . and Lewandowski (1 982) 1 . 
The a r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  i n t e r a c t i o n  i n v o l v e s  a number o f  i s s u e s :  
What i n f o r m a t i o n  shou ld  t h e  u s e r  c o n t r i b u t e  i n  an  i n t e r a c t i v e  
system? What s o r t  o f  q u e s t i o n s  shou ld  t h e  system ask  t h e  u s e r ,  
and what s o r t  o f  q u e s t i o n s  w i l l  t h e  u s e r  a s k  t h e  system? How 
f a r  should  t h e  u s e r  be  a l lowed t o  modify t h e  computer ized model? 
what should  be  done abou t  u n l i s t e d  o b j e c t i v e s ?  Methods based  on  
t h e  u t i l i t y  concep t  assume t h a t  t h e  u s e r ' s  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  
shou ld  b e  i d e n t i f i e d  as f a r  as p o s s i b l e  by a s k i n g  him q u e s t i o n s  
about pa i rwise  comparisons of a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  t rade-off  c o e f f i c i e n t s ,  
e t c .  [ see  Wallenius (1975) and Haimes e t  a l .  (1975) l .  Methods 
based on a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  assume t h a t  o v e r t  q u e s t i o n s  r e l a t e d  
t o  p re fe rences  and u t i l i t y  a r e  n o t  l e g i t i m a t e  (whi le  t h e s e  con- 
c e p t s  might be used t e c h n i c a l l y  we have no r i g h t  t o  assume t h a t  
u s e r s  t h i n k  i n  t h e s e  terms), and ask i n s t e a d  how a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  
should be modified [ see  Zeleny (1976),  Dyer (1972) ,  I g n i z i o  (1976),  
and Grauer e t  a l .  (1982) l .  The i s s u e  of  u n l i s t e d  o b j e c t i v e s  can 
be approached by genera t ing  a  P a r e t o - i n f e r i o r  a l t e r n a t i v e  wi th  
each Pareto-opt imal  a l t e r n a t i v e  ( f o r  example, by random modifica- 
t i o n  of c o n s t r a i n t s ,  p a r t i c u l ' a r l y  those  express ing  resource  
a v a i l a b i l i t y ) .  The u s e r  i s  then  asked t o  s t a t e  whether some 
a s p e c t s  of t h e  i n f e r i o r  a l t e r n a t i v e  a r e  a t t r a c t i v e  t o  him, and 
t o  t r y  t o  express  t h o s e  a s p e c t s  i n  terms of model v a r i a b l e s .  I f  
an a d d i t i o n a l  o b j e c t i v e  i s  a l ready  represen ted  i n  t h e  model, s ay ,  
by a  r e source  c o n s t r a i n t ,  t h e  u s e r  should have an easy way of 
inc lud ing  it i n  t h e  l i s t  of o b j e c t i v e s ,  f o r  example, by re-  
c l a s s i f y i n g  c o n s t r a i n t s  a s  o b j e c t i v e s .  
The second s t a g e  of  t h e  dec i s ion  p rocess ,  t h e  a c t u a l  cho ice  
o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  has  a l s o  been s t u d i e d  i n t e n s i v e l y  b u t  only  f o r  
q u i t e  s p e c i f i c  cases .  One problem t h a t  h a s  r ece ived  cons ide rab le  
t h e o r e t i c a l  and experimental  a t t e n t i o n  i s  t h a t  of d e r i v i n g  t h e  
opin ion  o f  a  group o f  e x p e r t s  using m u l t i a t t r i b u t e  u t i l i t y  
methods. [Keeney and R a i f f a  (1976)l .  While t h e s e  methods a r e  
q u i t e  u s e f u l  i n  analyz ing  t h e  opin ions  of  s e v e r a l  e x p e r t s ,  t hey  
a r e  of o n l y  l i m i t e d  use  i n  promoting a c t u a l  agreement between 
t h e  e x p e r t s .  R a i f f a  (1982) has  publ ished some new i d e a s  on t h i s  
s u b j e c t  on ly  r e c e n t l y .  Other methods f o r  group d e c i s i o n  making 
and f o r  s e t t i n g  up c h o i c e s  between d i s c r e t e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  have- 
a l s o  been s t u d i e d  by R i e t f e l d  (1980);  however, most of t h o s e  
d i s r e g a r d  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a s p e c t s  of d e c i s i o n  making.- These 
i s s u e s  r e q u i r e  f u r t h e r  empi r i ca l ,  t h e o r e t i c a l  and mathematical  s tudy.  
3.2 Mathematical Tools f o r  t h e  Analysis of Decisions 
of Independent Actors 
The theory  o f  games i s  an a r e a  of  mathematics t h a t  has  ex- 
panded very  r a p i d l y  over  t h e  p a s t  t h i r t y  y e a r s .  However, game 
theory  has  very r a r e l y  been a p p l i e d  t o  p r a c t i c a l  problems. The 
same cannot be said of operational gaming, in which independent 
actors in conflict situations are supposed to make decisions and 
a computerized simulation model informs them of the overall out- 
come of their individual decisions. Some comparisons of game- 
theoretical and operational gaming approaches to empirical 
decision situations show that even very experienced actors 
seldom arrive at the solutions predicted by game theory {see 
Young et al. (1981)J. One possible reason for this phenomenon 
is that empirical conflict situations are seldom characterized 
by independent actors with single objectives. Some work has been 
done on multiobjective game theory [see, for example, Germeer 
(1976)], but this field is not as advanced as the multiobjective 
analysis of centralized decision making. 
One possible development2) in this area could be an inter- 
active negotiation and mediation support system that attempts to 
model the prototype situations represented in Figures 3(b) and 
3(d) by the structure illustrated in Figure 5. Two independent 
actors, users of the system, are assumed to indicate their 
general wishes in terms of aspiration levels for various variables 
of interest (these might be different for each actor). The 
aspiration levels are then used as parameters in achievement 
functions in two models of negotiating staffs. A noncooperative 
status quo is established-in the first phase of interaction. 
This involves the computation of, the Nash equilibrium [Nash (1950)J 
defined by the achievement-functions of -staffs for each specifica- 
tion of aspiration levels; this is then reported to the users, 
who should modify their aspiration levels until a status quo 
accepted by both sides is -reached. Even in this first.phase 
there is a need for a mediating procedure-t-o--try-to lead the 
users to a status quo situation that they will both accept. 
2 
Research on this possibility has recently been initiated at 
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in 
Laxenburg, Austria. The scientists involved are the author of 
this paper, who suggested the prototype decision support system,' 
Zenon Fortuna, who has developed the first computerized elements 
of this system, and Pradeep Dubey, who is working on related 
game theoretical-questions. 
The second phase of interaction is concerned with finding a 
cooperative Kalai-~morodinsky solution, starting from the non- 
cooperative status quo solution [see Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975)l. 
If each player had only a single objective there would be no room 
for negotiation once the mediator model had proposed a Kalai- 
Smorodinsky solution. However, in a multiobjective situation, 
the proposed Kalai-Smorodinsky solution can be improved for each 
user provided that he indicates which objectives can be allowed 
to deteriorate so that other objectives may be improved. 
The interactive negotiation and mediation support system 
currently being developed at IIASA can be considered to be a 
product of a new approach to operational gaming, in which 
achievement functions and game equilibria are used to produce 
more realistic models of conflicts in decision making. Much 
algorithmic development and game-theoretical work still remains 
to be done. However, the prototype of the system shows that it 
is possible to combine methodological reflection on the practical 
requirements of decision-making situations with developments in 
game theory and multiobjective optimization. The author hopes 
that similar advances can also be achieved in hierarchical 
optimization and game theory, thus making them more useful for 
applied multiobjective analysis. 
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